Thus it can happen that military men, while skillfully planning their intricate operations and coordinating complicated maneuvers, remain curiously blind in failing to perceive that it is the outcome of the war, not the outcome of the campaigns within it, that determines how well their plans serve the nation's interests. As operations over the last twelve years have shown, the United States Armed Forces have become the dominant military force on earth. All services, operating in joint and combined environments, have proven themselves capable policy instruments. Where the U.S. has struggled, however, is in the area of conflict termination. Since World War 13, the U.S. has often prevailed militarily, but frequently failed to achieve policy goals. Examples of these termination failures include Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, Somalia and the Balkans.
Moreover, World War II was a war termination anomaly. How often in the future will the U.S. fight a war with the stated objective of the enemy's unconditional surrender? The prospect is unlikely. Senior military leaders must be prepared to fight highly constrained limited wars and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) with plans that focus not just on military success but also on winning the peace.
As leaders assess the condition and direction of the U.S. military, an opportunity now exists to take a long, hard look at conflict termination planning. A quick scan of the Joint Pubs gives the military professional the sense that the culture whole-heartily buys into the importance of conflict termination strategy, but the literature offers little help on designing such a strategy. It is time to take the next step. This step is creating an interagency organization and a doctrine that arms this organization with the tools to do termination planning. 1 
New Transition Mindset Needed
Military-dominant operations are but finite points in the long continuum defining U.S. relationships with foreign states. Our interactions with other nations are predominantly defined by diplomatic, economic and informational instruments of national power. To reinforce the transient nature of conflict as the dominant instrument of power, the U.S. military should clearly subordinate consideration of "termination" and "military end state" to the study of "transition" and "transition state" in our doctrine.
When the President decides to use military force, the military mindset is deploy, expeditiously conduct business, then rapidly exit. The consequence of a quick military departure is often diplomatic chiefs taking over U.S. leadership of a crisis without thorough deliberation with military leaders. Intense coordination generally occurs only at the beginning and end of a military operation. History has shown that the military's hasty exit leads to continuity breaks and detracts from our ability to successfully shape the environment for winning the peace and achieving the desired end state.
The application of militarily force is designed to set the conditions for the successful use of the political (a.k.a. diplomatic), economic and informational (a.k.a. psychological) instruments of power to achieve national objectives.2 These non-military forms of power are present during hostilities, but ordinarily play supporting roles. However, conflict has such a dramatic impact on U.S.-foreign state relations, ensuring its constrained, correctly-focused use is paramount to successfully applying the other instruments of power to achieve policy goals after the military's role has diminished.
Achievement of strategic objectives is facilitated by the proper hand-off of U.S. leadership to diplomats after acceptable military transition conditions have been met. Interagency coordination 2 throughout military operations is the linchpin to this successful transition. The planning approach should not be aimed toward military termination, but directed toward setting the stage for continued, successful U.S. interaction by other means. Our culture is too oriented on the military finish line and must think more about how the military leg of the race can best contribute to achieving national goals.
Planning a Skillful Transition
Each regional C1NC should have a standing interagency transition planning team. The cell should include members well versed in the application of military, diplomatic, informational and economic instruments of national power as well as in the interaction of these elements. The focus of this paper will be on the roles, responsibilities and make-up of this interagency planning team. I have named the planning team the Operations Transition Planning Cell (OTPC).
To reinforce the need for developing an OTPC with accompanying doctrine, I will first identify existing doctrinal shortfalls. Next, I will recommend how the OTPC should be organized and manned to eliminate these deficiencies. I will also describe the tasks the OTPC should accomplish to ensure a better transition. Keep in mind the aim of the OTPC is to assist the CINC in securing U.S. strategic objectives. To perform this function, the OTPC needs adapted and newly developed tools. Unfortunately, due to space constraints, I am unable to discuss needed techniques in detail, but will provide some ideas for further study. Defining the military transition conditions is one of the critical first steps in the estimate and planning process. Also the pub correctly states that military victory is measured by how it supports attainment of the overall political goals.7
Joint Pub 3-0 provides ample evidence of answering the "what," "when" and "why" of conflict termination planning. It is clear from the manual that the CINC is responsible for incorporating conflict termination into his campaign planning early-on and in a manner consistent with national goals. It is also evident that the U.S. believes that military success is measured by the ability to achieve desired political objectives. The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia is the only other good doctrinal source for further study on U.S. military conflict termination philosophy. The encyclopedia contains six pages devoted to termination.9 Some of the ideas are a repeat of Joint Pub 3-0, but new information about "when" to terminate, and some further discussion about termination applied to MOOTW situations, is contained in this reference. In addition, the photo of General Schwarzkopf discussing Desert Storm termination conditions with Iraqi leaders appears here. The photo seems to signal that regional CINCs must not only plan for successful termination, but should also be prepared to conduct 'negotiations personally. At the very least, a CINC needs to be able to provide negotiators with a list of military requirements that must be negotiated to create the military conditions which will set the stage for a successful transition. Such a list can be critical when the President halts military operations before these conditions are achieved on the ground, a situation General Schwarzkopf faced personally (and unfortunately had no such list).
Individual service publications do not provide much help for the conflict termination planner. The only publication that addresses the issue directly is the U.S. Army's keystone manual, FM 100-5, Operations.10 The manual emphasizes the importance of termination considerations, but only provides general overarching guidance on the subject.
Termination Considerations in Operational Art
Military theorists have pointed out the importance of conflict termination planning for centuries. Clausewitz stressed planning a military campaign to completion from the beginning in order to achieve political objectives.11 Additionally, in his book on operational art used at the Naval War College, theorist Milan Vego emphasizes planning military operations oriented toward the desired end state. He stresses that this end state includes political, diplomatic, economic, and social conditions.12
These theorists and others like Sun Tzu13 all recognize that conflict termination deserves significant emphasis. Clausewitz even discusses creating those military conditions that will facilitate negotiations.14 His recommendation is incorporated into U.S. military termination doctrine in principle. Clausewitz also cautions against "overshooting the target" in military operations.15 In limited wars, combatant commanders must seek the appropriate culminating point to shape the environment for favorable peace terms.
Termination Shortfalls
What doctrine and military theorists fail to tell us is how to conduct successful termination planning. We get a sense that termination planning is vital and that it should be done from the very beginning. U.S. doctrine and theorists also tell us we must not only create military conditions favorable to peace, but should also ensure that political, economic and social circumstances are aligned to secure U.S. interests. However, these sources are silent in defining the pathway from war-winning to peace-winning. The purpose of the Operations Transition Planning Cell is to assist the CINC in achieving U.S. political objectives given to him by the NCA. As an interagency group, the OTPC is organized for success. While the majority of the CINC's staff focuses solely on military matters, this team provides the CINC with recommendations on achieving favorable conditions in all power dimensions. Using the brain trust of his own OTPC, the CINC can interact with the NCA offering options throughout the course of a campaign. Since these options will come from diverse experts encompassing all policy instruments, they are likely to anticipate possible objections and therefore have added legitimacy with national security leaders.
OTPC Tasks
The OTPC has many assignments. I will discuss six of the most significant.
• Assisting with Desired End State Definition After verifying the initial U.S. objectives, the first important OTPC task is to define the proposed desired end state. In some cases, this might mean taking the initiative in end state planning. Crises develop quickly and unexpectedly, and the NCA and national security team may not have time to fully define all of the desired end state elements. Operation Restore Hope, the 1992 MOOTW in Somalia, is a case in point. Here, a tactical planning staff had to assist the chain of command with desired end state planning with less than optimal results.17 The creation of the OTPC would lift this additional burden from military operators and give desired end state definition the attention it demands. Such a process would encourage senior leaders to conduct serious deliberations on the subject and allow the rest of the CINC's planning staff to focus on deployment and initial employment of military forces.
• Defining Military Transition Conditions
After the initial desired end state delineation, the OTPC will assist in defining the military conditions that will lead to a successful transition to diplomatic leadership. These conditions will become the CINC's military objectives. In conjunction with military planners, the OTPC will advise the CINC on the appropriate ways and means to achieve these objectives. In developing the CINC's directives, the OTPC's role is to incorporate (and synchronize) all key dimensions into the plan: political, social, economic, diplomatic, military and informational. When circumstances in some variables match favorable transition conditions, the OTPC should advise the CINC on how to maintain this preferred state in order to progress toward successful hand-off. Ideally, when all transition conditions are met, the CINC is ready to hand-off leadership to diplomats.
• Monitoring, Assessing and Recommending Changes to Strategy During the course of military operations, changes are inevitable. Political aims may change, the desired end state may be modified, and conditions that lead to success may vary. For this reason, the OTPC has an important monitoring and assessment role. The OTPC deliberates strategy and the consequences of military actions. The OTPC should advise the CINC on when and how to modify his approach to the conflict.
To correctly evaluate conditions, the OTPC needs to continually revise their net assessment, taking full account of economic, social, psychological and diplomatic aspects of the situation. The OTPC must be integrated into all available theater informational resources. As battlespace awareness increases, the OTPC advises the CINC on ways to calibrate objectives and refine strategy. As components of strategy change, the CINC can then provide higher quality feedback to national leaders on the implications of altered strategy. 9 
• Developing Contingencies
During the planning of a major joint operation, the J-5 develops branches and sequels to the base plan. Similarly, the OTPC must develop offshoots and follow-on activities that will lead to peace-winning. As branches and sequels often develop through wargaming, the OTPC members need to "what-if ' the consequences of a CINC's strategy on existing economic, diplomatic, informational and social circumstances. Wargaming done by interagency experts will lead to viable additional options for the CINC. This activity will increase the unified commander's agility.
• Leading the Transition Eventually, as the military transition state approaches, a hand-off to diplomatic leaders will occur. The OTPC should play the lead role in planning this transition. Functional OTPC experts will coordinate with their counterparts from the Country Teams to ensure a smooth changeover.
The OTPC should play a vital role in determining the size and roles of military forces in post¬ hostility operations. If transition occurs prior to achieving all military objectives, the OTPC must provide diplomats with a list of unfulfilled military conditions to negotiate.
OTPC Organization
Given that a JTF commander's concern will be to ensure unity of effort, too brief a time to establish relationships can exacerbate the tensions that exist naturally between and among so many disparate agencies with their own internal agenda and outside sponsors... 19 LTG Schroeder, commander of JTF Support Hope, made this comment, which appears in Chapter IH of Joint Pub 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations. He was emphasizing the challenge of forming interagency teams while simultaneously conducting fastpaced military operations. A way to alleviate some of the additional burden would be to have a strong, previously-established interagency link prior to military commitment. 10 For this reason, the OTPC should be stood up in each geographic unified commander's Strategic Planning Directorate on a permanent basis. During peacetime engagement, the OTPC should be directly involved in strategic planning as well as political-military coordination. The OTPC could be used by the CINC to strengthen ties with other government agencies. The OTPC's military members would benefit as they become familiar with other agency techniques and practices. Transition planning exercises could be conducted separate from or in conjunction with major joint operations to provide the OTPC with experience in transition state planning. The OTPC could assist the CINC in directing his engagement plans to achieve national policy goals.
As crises erupt and CINCs form JTFs, the OTPC can assist the JTF plans cell as required.
Functional experts from the CINC's OTPC would be available to act as planning liaisons with other U.S. agencies. Why not establish a JTF OTPC? This option is a possibility to consider, but it would do nothing to alleviate the challenges LTG Schroeder stated. Additionally, the JTF Commander is directly responsible to the regional CINC, not to the NCA. The OTPC is designed to provide a theater-to-national strategy link. Also, JTFs are often formed for short duration operations. By the time the JTF OTPC is created, trained and working, the operation may be nearly complete and many of the benefits of early transition planning would not be available. However, under certain circumstances such as the employment of a sizable JTF for a long duration, it might be wise to stand-up an additional OTPC.
OTPC Membership
Successful conflict termination requires integration of all the instruments ofpower.20
As a strategic planning cell within the CINC's J-5, the OTPC should include functional experts from several national agencies, hi addition to being experts in non-military instruments of power, these staff members should be formally trained in military decision making doctrine and objectives. This staffer would also be used to devise methods for countering the enemy's propaganda campaign, allowing the U.S. to maintain the initiative in the information operations arena.
The OTPC needs membership from national intelligence agencies. As the lead U.S. CINCs also have economic experts. These advisors provide economic engagement and deliberate planning recommendations to the CINC's joint staff. Since economics is such a cmcial 13 f instrument of national power, the OTPC needs specialists on his staff. To bolster the CINC's assigned experts, a representative from the USAID should be assigned to the OTPC. The USAID has the mission to assist foreign governments with economic growth, political freedom and good governance. The agency is a primary player in U.S. government foreign disaster relief efforts. As such, officials from this agency assigned to a CINC's planning directorate would be especially suited for conflict resolution MOOTWs. USAID could also be sent to these schools for short courses on conflict termination and transition planning. Here they would also learn the basics of joint military decision-making.
The OTPC should be an organization that has a standard nucleus consisting of those members discussed above. The CINC and his key subordinates can (and should) recommend changes to the OTPC. The OTPC will be a dynamic organization with complete membership dependent on the specific contingency. During multi-national operations, for instance, planners 14 from other nations may be included. During some types of MOOTW, it might be appropriate to seek advice from non-governmental or private volunteer organizations for use in transition planning.
Extending invitations to members outside the U.S. federal government would produce additional challenges for the OTPC. For instance, access to some sources of intelligence would be restricted.
Nonetheless, in UN and coalition operations, the benefits of a long-term, collective approach may outweigh the constraints. Furthermore, for political reasons, the CINC may not have a choice but to accept foreign augmentation. However, the core of the OTPC should work together on a routine basis to develop as an effective planning team.
OTPC Implementation
The fact is that of the three categories of the spectrum of conflict (Deter, Fight, Terminate), war termination has been virtually ignored. In our fascination with the means of strategy, we have 25 neglected the study of its ends -those objects that will lead directly to peace. Before a publication can be developed, the operations transition doctrine needs to be developed. Operational planning concepts already in use like the commander's estimate of the situation can be modified to provide the basis for the new doctrine. Planners from the State Department, the CIA and other U.S. agencies should be consulted as doctrine is advanced.
Theorists and scholars at the nation's senior military colleges should provide recommendations.
The U.S. military must make a concerted effort to fill this void. We are the best war fighters in the world. Let's invest the energy required to become better peace planners.
We need not wait for a joint publication to stand-up the Operations Transition Planning Cells. A "beta-OTPC" should be organized now in one of the geographic CINC headquarters. This trial OTPC could be put through intensive exercises and wargames designed to determine the appropriate interagency organization. The beta-OTPC could also develop and explore the use of different tools for conducting transition planning. After testing, a validated "fielding version" of the OTPC could then be stood-up in all geographic CINC J-5's.
Counterarguments
Some might argue that permanently assigning representatives of other federal agencies to a joint military headquarters is not needed. What will suffice is a good doctrine with some interagency exercises and conferences to affect the same quality solutions or protocols. I disagree.
Transition planning is not a science. Although doctrine is a good guide, no formulas exist that will always lead to a favorable conflict resolution. The art of planning military operations requires close coordination from a staff that is accustomed to working together all the time. Why should transition planning be any easier? If anything, transition strategies are more difficult, because they must incorporate all instruments of national power in a coherent, synchronized fashion.
Others might question the benefit of the OTPC to federal agencies asked to provide representatives. Why should these agencies provide representatives to the CINC's OTPC? Firstly, during conflicts, all instruments of national power are focused on achieving the desired end state.
Although not the dominant player, agencies like State, CIA, USAID and Commerce are accountable for components of the national grand strategy during major military operations. The need for closer interagency cooperation during complex contingencies to achieve durable peace and stability is 16 A explicitly stated in Presidential Decision Directive-56, a Clinton Administration White Paper.
The OTPC exists to achieve a plan that integrates all power mechanisms. This integrated approach can also be extended to peacetime engagement strategies achieving greater efficiencies.
Additionally, the OTPC provides other agencies a forum for their ideas and recommendations.
OTPC members can advocate agency programs from the inside during military operations, as opposed to from the outside, which is the current model. Thirdly, OTPC membership would allow resource-strapped agencies access to military assets. These assets could be utilized to carry out multi-agency tasks in support of U.S. foreign policy goals.
IV. CONCLUSION
The object of war is a better peace...Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire. 27 - Liddell Hart The future application of military power is likely to be within the context of a limited war or MOOTW. These environments are complex and filled with uncertainty and constraints. If we commit the military to protecting U.S. interests, we should do so with a clear strategy for winning the peace through successful transition planning.
The military must shift focus from military termination to military transition. To make this adjustment, our mindset needs to change. Sustaining our joint war fighting expertise is critical, but we must improve our interagency coordination efforts throughout military-dominant operations.
The OTPC, or an organization with a different name but similar purpose, is a step in the right direction. By creating this organization with an accompanying doctrine, we can avoid stumbling into peacemaking and successfully achieve the political objectives we were tasked to accomplish.
